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Purpose: This study seeks to assess the often repeated, but empirically unconfirmed, supposition that 
there is a positive connection between foreign board members (FBMs) and firm innovativeness, and to 
set a research agenda for future studies on the topic. 
Design: The analyses are based on a large sample of firms within the European Union, utilizing patent 
and trademark data together with information on the national diversity of the boards. 
Findings: The analyses confirm that there is a positive association between FBMs and firm 
innovativeness. Contrary to expectations, FBMs from less innovative countries than the countries of 
their host companies are more often associated with innovative firms than are FBMs from more 
innovative countries. 
Research implications: This study provides empirical support for propositions, drawn from resource 
dependency theory and group effectiveness/diversity theories, that diverse boards of directors can lead 
to greater firm-level creativity and innovativeness. It also outlines a detailed research agenda for future 
studies to build on the tentative findings presented in this paper. 
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Practical implications: The findings suggest that greater national diversity in the board of directors 
can enhance innovation.  
Originality: Earlier studies on board diversity have not analysed empirically the issue of national 
diversity. The originality of this paper lies in its attempt to address this gap in the corporate governance 
literature. 
Keywords: Board of Directors; Corporate Governance; Diversity; European Union; Foreign Board 
Members; Innovation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research on corporate governance has recently begun to investigate the links between board 
diversity, particularly in terms of gender diversity, and innovation (Torchia et al., 2011; Galia 
and Zenou, 2012; Adams et al., 2015). While most accounts hypothesize that national diversity 
(e.g. foreign workers) provide different perspectives that contribute to greater variety of ideas 
and enhanced innovation in the firm, these notions have mostly remained entirely theoretical 
(Solheim and Fitjar, 2016). This applies also in the case of board diversity and innovation: 
there is no systematic empirical evidence corroborating the supposition of a positive 
relationship between foreign board members (FBMs) and firm innovativeness[1]. Therefore, the 
originality of this paper lies in its attempt to address this gap between the theoretical debates 
and the lack of empirical accounts within the corporate governance literature. Specifically, the 
following two research questions are addressed: 1) are firms with FBMs more innovative and 
2) are firms with FBMs from more innovative countries more innovative than those with FBMs 
from less innovative countries? To address these questions, the relationship between FBMs and 
the innovation activities of some 1 545 000 currently active firms in the European Union (EU) 
are explored, utilizing the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk, 2016).  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
A definite trend towards boards becoming more multinational has been observed, indicating 
that having FBMs and foreigners in other top management positions has become increasingly 
commonplace (Staples, 2007; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2010). Accordingly, in the 1980’s 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) had already argued that firm-level innovations are strongly 
associated with the views, backgrounds and experiences of top management teams, i.e. the 
“upper echelons”. In the contemporary globalized world, also FBMs may play an important 
role in the innovativeness of their host companies. While no direct evidence exists on the link 
between FBMs and firm-level innovativeness, some studies have investigated the potential 
impacts that FBMs could have on firm-level performance and corporate governance (e.g. 
Oxelheim and Randøy, 2005; Choi et al., 2012). This literature has commonly agreed that board 
diversity has a positive impact on firm reputation and performance, supporting the positive 
aspects of “national diversity” in board rooms. 
 
With the positive relationship between firm performance and FBMs in mind, the question arises 
to what extent FBMs might be associated with firm innovativeness. Innovation is commonly 
understood as a social process which heavily relies on the recombination of existing knowledge 
to form new knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 2007). Consequently, a diverse board with board 
members (BMs) with different backgrounds supposedly grants more opportunities for novel 
knowledge combinations, and thus innovations. When framing the discussion on board 
diversity and firm-level innovativeness, two commonly identified reference points are: 1) 
resource dependency theory, and 2) group effectiveness/diversity theories. The resource 
dependency theory focuses on the availability of, and the possibilities for controlling, critical 
resources that are of utmost importance for the performance and survival of firms (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Similarly, the group effectiveness/diversity theories assume that a diverse 
4 
 
board of directors will lead to a wider set of perspectives, ideas, expertise and skill, which can 
result in greater creativity and innovativeness (Ruigrok et al., 2006; van Veen et al., 2014). 
Thus, a diversified board of directors with varying nationalities can be a valuable asset due to 
the variety of additional (knowledge) resources that the FBMs bring into the firm via their skills 
and expertise (Ruigrok et al., 2006; Eulerich et al., 2013). In the case of FBMs, this is 
particularly related to their additional international network contacts and knowledge sources 
(Arnegger et al., 2014). Notably, firms with FBMs can be expected to engage in a wider set of 
international relationships, which in turn are expected to lead to higher levels of innovation (cf. 
Solheim and Fitjar, 2016).  
 
Based on these general theories, diverse boards, for example in terms of ethnicity and gender, 
have been empirically linked to stronger firm-level performance (Arena et al., 2015; Toumi et 
al., 2016) and innovativeness (Galia and Zenou, 2012; Zona et al., 2013; Cook and Glass, 
2015). Of course, with increasing national board diversity there are potential time consuming 
conflicts and transaction costs associated with cultural and institutional (e.g. laws and 
regulations) distance, and the use of non-native languages in board meeting. However, the 
existing literature has frequently conceptually deduced that firms with FBMs are likely to be 
more innovative and creative than firms with solely national BMs (Eulerich et al., 2013; van 
Veen et al., 2014; Piekkari et al., 2015). Moreover, the assumption of a positive association 
between FBMs and firm-level innovativeness sits comfortably alongside most of the related 
literature on ethnic and gender diversity (Basset-Jones, 2005; Torchia et al., 2011; Nathan and 
Lee, 2013). While there are, of course, reasons for board membership other than those strictly 
related to innovation, the above notions lead to our first hypothesis. As discussed in the 
resource dependency and group effectiveness/diversity theories, diversified board of directors 
with varying nationalities are assumed to constitute a valuable asset for a firm, since they bring 
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in a wider set of ideas and additional knowledge resources (Rice et al. 2012). Therefore, we 
assume that board diversity in terms of FBMs – as in the cases of ethnic and gender diversity 
– also has a positive association with firm-level innovativeness (based on patents and 
trademarks; see Section “Innovativeness” below): 
 
Hypothesis 1. Firms with FBMs are more innovative than firms that do not have FBMs. 
 
It is not only relevant to ask whether there are FBMs but also where these FBMs come from: 
less innovative countries are commonly considered to have fewer top-level managers living 
and working in foreign countries compared to highly innovative countries (cf. van Veen and 
Marsman, 2008). It could be argued that there might be little for the firm to learn from FBMs 
originating from countries that have laggard innovation performance. This is how the 
relationship is commonly perceived, for example, in the case of post-communist countries, 
which at one point were strongly dependent on Western countries for technological aid and 
assistance (Michailova and Jormanainen, 2011). As such, firms from advanced countries have 
invested in less developed ones to diversify their products to fit these growing markets 
(Gerybadze and Merk, 2014). Consequently, the literature on cross-border knowledge transfer 
has hypothesized that the magnitude of the knowledge transferred from international sources 
will tend to increase in relation to the quality gap between the origin and destination of these 
knowledge flows (Kotabe et al., 2007). Since, less-developed countries can benefit from 
connections to technologically and economically advanced countries (Levin and Barnard, 
2013), it is reasonable to assume that FBMs from more innovative countries (based on the 
ranking of the country in the “Innovation Union Scoreboard”; see Section “Innovativeness” 
below) are likely to have a greater potential impact on the innovativeness of firms in less 
advanced countries than the other way around. In short, and in accordance with the resource 
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dependency theory, the networks of FBMs from highly advanced countries can link the 
company to the (more) sophisticated knowledge and technology of their home countries. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is that: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Firms with FBMs from more innovative countries are more innovative than 
firms with FBMs from less innovative countries. 
 
In order to realise innovation gains from cross-border knowledge transfers, the firms must have 
sufficient capacity to acquire, assimilate and exploit the transferred knowledge: this is termed 
as “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and Gerard, 2002). There is 
considerable literature stressing that, without the necessary absorptive capacity, the recipient 
of advanced new knowledge will be constrained in terms of being able to benefit from it (Liu 
and Buck, 2007; Mancusi, 2008). It has also been emphasised that by facilitating access to, and 
absorption of, external knowledge, (foreign) BMs are important components of firms’ 
absorptive capacity (Zahra et al., 2009; Giannetti et al., 2015). Firms with larger existing stocks 
of knowledge will also generally be more capable of absorbing new knowledge. Absorptive 
capacity is greatest when actors (in this case BMs) share similar technological backgrounds. In 
contrast, high technological distance would increase novelty value, but the absorptive capacity 
would be insufficient to make use of the divergent knowledge (Nooteboom et al., 2007). In 
other words, the technological backgrounds of the FBMs and the firm should be sufficiently 
similar for the firm to understand and take advantage of the knowledge brought by the FBM, 
but dissimilar enough for there to be something new to learn. Since, the absorptive capacity is 
commonly measured through R&D and educational variables relating to the workforce 
(Kostopoulos et al., 2011), that is, through proxy input indicators of innovation, we consider 
that the innovative performance of the host and home country (based on the ranking of the 
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country in the “Innovation Union Scoreboard”; see Section “Innovativeness” below) of FBMs 
is indicative of the technological distance between them. This is in line with earlier studies 
which have discussed the group effectiveness/diversity theory: these earlier studies have 
addressed how a more diversified board of directors will lead to a broader set of ideas, skills 
and perspectives (van Veen et al., 2014), but that diversified boards (in this case: distance in 
terms of technological expertise) face higher transaction costs in terms of e.g. increased risk of 
conflict, communication problems and the longer times required for consensus building 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; van der Walt et al., 2006; Piekkari et al., 2015). Therefore, lastly we 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Firms with FBMs from countries with relatively similar innovative 
capabilities are more innovative than firms with FBMs from countries with significantly 
lower or higher innovative capabilities. 
 
These issues are also related to firm size: board diversity increases with firm size, but at 
decreasing rates (Arnegger et al., 2014). Moreover, there is considerable literature which 
discusses the relationship between size and the innovativeness of firms (Kleinknecht, 1989; 
Dolfsma and van der Velde, 2014). Therefore, since both themes which are studied here, that 
is board diversity and firm innovativeness, are strongly related to firm size (Zona et al., 2013), 
the analyses will be performed separately with aggregate level data and with data divided into 
different firm size classes. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Foreign board members 
In the case of FBMs, we use a dichotomous variable: one indicates that a company in a country 
has a FBM from another specific EU country, and zero indicates it has no FBMs. The sample 
properties in terms of the number of firms and shares of innovative firms are presented in Table 
1. We decided to focus on the EU-28 countries, since the Union’s internal freedom of 
movement and rights of residence mean that these countries have relatively similar institutional 
arrangements in respect of working or living abroad in the other Member States. Of course, 
even though EU legislation guarantees the free movement of workers within the EU, other 
issues – such as institutional and cultural differences – still impede board internationalization 
(van Veen and Elbertsen, 2008; Arnaboldi and Casu, 2011). However, the importance of FBMs 
has been acknowledged by the European Commission (2011), which is aiming to harmonize 
(some of) these differences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Table 1. Sample properties per country 
Country  1 2 3 4 5 Country  1 2 3 4 5 
Austria  30294 30333 3154 27 % 10 % Italy  165653 170925 21430 23 % 12 % 
Belgium  29994 34045 3007 24 % 7 % Latvia  9417 11149 245 4 % 2 % 
Bulgaria  46565 47117 777 13 % 2 % Lithuania  18607 18630 374 0 % 2 % 
Croatia  12101 12111 150 9 % 1 % Luxemburg  1443 2121 256 26 % 7 % 
Cyprus  489 570 31 14 % 5 % Malta  198 301 42 18 % 11 % 
Czech Rep.  51493 52444 2887 24 % 5 % Netherlands  89078 89201 5882 40 % 7 % 
Denmark  7850 9978 1734 32 % 14 % Poland  82049 82066 1225 47 % 1 % 
Estonia  5347 6466 267 7 % 4 % Portugal  40762 42257 2231 18 % 5 % 
Finland  14863 17195 2300 30 % 11 % Romania  57503 57827 1027 12 % 2 % 
France  77395 79690 8854 45 % 10 % Slovakia  26613 27246 490 10 % 2 % 
Germany  297343 297522 39928 36 % 13 % Slovenia  6636 6641 533 0 % 8 % 
Greece  12022 12895 519 8 % 4 % Spain  107454 113873 14060 23 % 12 % 
Hungary  33402 33746 1075 18 % 3 % Sweden  37819 43632 4476 26 % 8 % 
Ireland  10947 15249 823 14 % 3 % UK  198991 230611 12803 30 % 2 % 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 52583 55209 4664 21 % 6 % 
Median 30144 32040 1150 20 % 5 % 
Min 198 301 31 0 % 1 % 
Max 297343 297522 39928 47 % 14 % 
Standard deviation 68394 71245 8576 13 % 4 % 
1 Number of firms with no FBMs in this country   
2 Number of firms in this country 
3 Number of innovative firms in this country 
4 Share of firms with FBMs and with patents and/or trademarks 
5 Share of firms with entirely domestic boards with patents and/or trademarks 
 
Innovativeness 
Firm innovativeness: Patents and trademarks are used here to signal whether the firm is 
innovative. In line with Santamaría et al. (2009), we use a dichotomous variable: one if a 
company has been granted either a patent or a trademark and zero if not. For example, Acs et 
al. (2002) have shown empirically that patents act as a valid measure of innovative activity, 
providing in-depth information on technological product innovation, whereas for example 
Mendonca et al. (2004) have shown the validity of trademark analysis, which capture relevant 
aspects of innovation and the process of industrial change, when measuring service innovation. 
As such, the two indicators complement each other: patents as a measure of technological 
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product innovation and trademarks as a measure of service innovation. Using these 
(dichotomous) approaches to firm innovativeness (innovative vs. non-innovative firms) based 
on secondary data can be criticized for failing to capture the complexity of innovation. 
However, the same logic is also widely used in studies using primary data collected through 
questionnaires or interviews, utilizing questions such as ‘Has your company introduced an 
innovation? Yes/No’. The most notable example of this is the Community Innovation Survey 
of the European Union. Notwithstanding, this paper also acknowledges that relying only on 
patents and trademarks has limitations, mainly because they do not account for all types of 
innovation and since not all patents and trademarks lead to new products or services being 
introduced into the market.  
 
Home and host country innovativeness of foreign board members: The “Innovation Union 
Scoreboard” was utilized to classify the EU-28 countries according to their innovation 
performance. Therefore, for H2 we observe the pair-wise links of FBMs from countries that 
are: a) more innovative and b) less innovative than the host country. For H3 we examine the 
pair-wise links of FBMs based on the reported innovation performance groups of their home 
countries (European Commission, 2015: p.5). Although composite metrics, such as the 
Innovation Union Scoreboard have been widely used in studies of innovation and 
internationalization (e.g. Filippetti et al., 2011), it is acknowledged that it is problematic to use 
these country-level data to analyse the potential innovativeness of individual FBMs. However, 
the index does provide coherent and up-to-date proxy data for national variations in the 
expected innovativeness of FBMs that otherwise would remain unaccounted for in the scale of 
analysis applied in this study. Similar approaches (i.e. using country-level determinants of 
FBM recruitment processes) have been used before as a logical first step to explore this rarely 
studied phenomenon (e.g. van Veen et al., 2014). 
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Data, sample and methods 
Data was derived data from the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk, 2016) containing 
management, financial and ownership information on over 200 million private and listed 
companies worldwide. Pair-wise data was collected on the number of firms with foreign 
members of the board of directors according to their countries of nationality (as reported in the 
Orbis database) for both host and home country. Additionally, the number of firms that do not 
have FBMs was also recorded. All these search procedures were undertaken separately in the 
case of innovative and non-innovative firms for three different size classes, based on the 
standard Eurostat classification: small (10–49 employees), medium-sized (50–249 employees) 
and large (≥250 employees) firms as well as for the aggregated total numbers. The following 
double dichotomy was utilized (see sample properties in Table 2 and a graphic overview in 
Figure 1): 
 
1) Number of innovative firms per country divided into:  
a. Firms that have FBMs in terms of the home country of these BMs (e.g. the 
number of Austrian firms with a patent and/or a trademark and at least one BM 
from another specific EU country) 
b. Firms that do not have FBMs (e.g. the number of Austrian firms with a patent 
and/or a trademark with only Austrian BMs) 
2) Number of non-innovative firms per country divided into: 
a. Firms that have FBMs in terms of the home country of these BMs 
b. Firms that do not have FBMs 
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Table 2. The distribution of foreign board members and innovative firms across the size classes of the 
sample 
Size group Share of firms Firms with/without 
foreign BMs from EU-28 
Innovative/non-
innovative firms 
Small 78 % 3 % / 97 % 5 % / 95 % 
Medium-Sized 18 % 10 % / 90 % 16 % / 84 % 
Large 4 % 20 % / 80 % 31 % / 69 % 
Total 100 % 5 % / 95 % 8 % / 92 % 
 
 
Figure 1. A graphic overview on sample categories. 
 
The resulting sample includes an impressive number of 1 545 841 currently active firms within 
the EU 28: the data were collected between November 22nd and 23th 2016. Thus, the data on 
the BMs and firms with patents and/or trademarks corresponds to the situation at the end of 
2016. Due to the EU-wide focus, and the resulting size of the sample, and as the Orbis database 
does not give access to time-series datasets, a cross sectional analysis is undertaken at this 
stage. The majority (circa 78%) of the firms in the sample are small firms. When measured 
with patents and trademarks, circa 8% of the companies in the sample can be considered to be 
innovative (i.e. have been granted a patent or a trademark). The number of innovative firms 
per country is presented in Table 1. There are, of course, wide variations in the share of 
innovative countries across the EU countries, while firm size is also important:  the larger the 
size class of the firm, the more likely it is that a firm has a FBM (from another EU country) 
and that it owns a patent or a trademark and can, thus, be considered innovative (Table 2). 
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While the database has some missing, incomplete and inconsistent information (i.e. there may 
be some errors in e.g. the reported nationalities of the BMs), the reliability of the Orbis database 
and measures it includes are widely considered to meet high standards: the database provides 
respectable coverage of European firms and has been evaluated to be generally reliable, 
credible and coherent (Pinto Ribeiro et al., 2010).  
 
Mann Whitney U tests are used to assess the statistical differences between country groups to 
explore the innovative performance of firms with and without FBMs. The method of analysis 
used in this study is in line with several earlier studies of board diversity and firm performance 
(e.g. Virtanen, 2012; Joecks et al., 2013; Zainal et al., 2013), and based on the fact that the 
variable describing whether firms have or do not have FBMs is categorical. This has limitations 
concerning the endogeneity problem in terms of, for example, simultaneous causality. 
Therefore, more elaborate approaches will be needed to test the initial exploratory statements 
made in this paper. This will be discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
 
Additionally, descriptive statistics, graphical illustrations and a decision tree are provided to 
underline key statements and to clarify the implications of the findings. The results, thus, 
provide a good overview of the associations between FBMs and firm-level innovativeness. 
However, it is noted that the tenure of a FBM and the term of a patent (the period it is in force) 
do not always coincide. Therefore, an important limitation is that, at this stage, associations 
rather than causality are examined. Since this paper provides an initial overview of the novel 
topic at hand, the data collection efforts required to analyse causality are beyond its scope: that 
would require more sophisticated time-series firm-matched data for the years when FBMs have 
been on the boards, as well as data on the years when patents and trademarks have been granted. 
However, due to the relatively large sample employed, the findings do provide a reliable picture 
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of whether there is an association between FBMs and the innovativeness of the firm. This is 
the (very) first step towards investigating causal relationships: without the presence of such an 
association, it would be unlikely that there are causal relationships between the investigated 
variables. 
 
RESULTS 
Figure 2 presents an overview of the results in relation to H1, namely the percentages of 
innovative firms amongst those firms with FBMs from another EU-28 country compared to the 
baseline of innovative firms without FBMs. The graphical outline of the results already hints 
at a conclusion, namely that, irrespective of the institutional and legislative differences between 
EU Member States, firms throughout the EU with FBMs from other EU-28 countries are more 
innovative than firms without FBMs. In 26 out of the 28 EU-countries, the share of innovative 
firms is higher among firms with FBMs compared to the share of innovative firms among 
companies with solely domestic board rooms (Table 1). Further, in 72% of cases (N=565 pair-
wise country comparisons), the values are higher for firms with FBMs from a specific EU-28 
country compared to the baseline of companies that do not have FBMs. If pair-wise 
comparisons with scores of 0% and 100% are excluded as outliers (since, they are in almost 
every case the outcome of a single or very few observations), the corresponding figure rises to 
99% (N=394 pair-wise country comparisons) (Figure 2). Bearing in mind that the majority of 
our sample is formed of non-innovative small firms without FBMs, including these in the 
analysis lowers the country-wise aggregate baseline of innovative companies that do not have 
FBMs. Therefore, the above reported aggregate figure is higher than the corresponding figures 
for small, medium-sized and large firms that are 96%, 90% and 89% respectively (0% and 
100% excluded). These results underline not only the connection between FBMs and firm-level 
innovativeness but also their connection to firm size: it is rare for small firms to have FBMs 
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but, when they do, these companies are often innovative. Even though no claim is made of 
there being a causal relation, a strong association exists between FBMs and firm 
innovativeness. Thus, the results confirm the hypothesis (H1) that firms with FBMs are more 
innovative than firms that do not have FBMs. 
 
 
Figure 2. Overview of the connection between FBMs (within the EU-28) and firm-level innovativeness 
according to the pair-wise country comparisons (0% and 100% excluded) 
 
In the case of H2, the data show that there are more likely to be FBMs from more innovative 
than less innovative countries. This is the case in 19 out of the 26 (the most – Sweden – and 
the least – Romania – innovative countries have been excluded) countries included, after 
normalizing the figures according to the total number of firms in the home countries, i.e. by 
the size of the national economy of the foreign BMs. The countries showing contrasting 
evidence can be explained almost solely by reference to geographical proximity. For example, 
in the cases of 1) Cyprus, 2) Czech Republic, 3) Lithuania and 4) Portugal, the contrasting 
evidence is explained through the high numbers of foreign BMs from their immediate but less 
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innovative neighbours: 1) Greece, 2) Slovakia, 3) Latvia and 4) Spain, respectively. This, of 
course, can also applies inversely, as high figures can be influenced by more innovative 
neighbours. Therefore, we sought to control for this geographical “bias” by repeating the 
comparison, after the “flows” of foreign BMs from “neighbouring countries”, defined by 
border contiguity, had been excluded. As a result, out of the initially identified seven countries 
only two countries continued to show evidence that FBMs would come from less innovative 
countries underlining the “neighbourhood effect” in the origins of FBMs.  
 
However, the direct opposite of what was predicted based on the literature is observed in one 
important respect: instead of firms with FBMs from more innovative countries being more 
innovative, it is the other way around. According to the pair-wise country comparisons, firms 
with FBMs from less innovative countries are more innovative (Figure 3a). A Mann Whitney 
U test indicates that, when all comparisons are included, this difference is statistically 
significant at a level of p<0.001 (N=290 and 274 for country-wise comparisons with FBMs 
from more and less innovative countries respectively). These results (p<0.001) hold for all size 
classes: small, medium-sized and large firms. The significance remains at a level of p<0.001 
even when pair-wise comparisons with scores of 0% and 100% were excluded as above (N=201 
and 193 for country-wise comparisons with FBMs from more and less innovative counties 
respectively). As stated, this contrasts with our hypothesis (H2) and expectations based on the 
existing literature.  
 
With regards to H3, we divided the pair-wise country comparisons into different groups 
depending on the origin of the FBMs i.e. whether they are from more or less innovative 
countries. Specifically in accordance with the Innovation Union Scoreboard (European 
Commission, 2015: p.5), pair-wise comparisons were defined where the FBMs are coming: 1) 
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from a country belonging to a significantly higher innovation performance group as “Higher 
+2” (e.g. Swedish BMs in Estonia), 2) from a country that is in a slightly higher innovation 
performance group as “Higher” (e.g. Irish BMs in Italy), 3) from within the same performance 
group as “Same” (e.g. Finnish BMs in Germany) and analogously vice versa 4) “Lower” and 
5) “Lower -2”. From Figure 3b we can observe that when the innovation performance group 
of the FBMs’ home countries is lower compared to the host country of their firms, the firms in 
question are more often innovative rather than the other way around. The Mann Whitney U 
tests confirm most of these differences to be statistically significant when all comparisons are 
included in the analysis, and when scores of 0% and 100% were excluded (Table 3). The 
analyses were repeated for the different size classes and the results largely follow the aggregate 
picture presented above. However, whereas in the case of small firms the statistically 
significant results were much in line with the aggregate results, the corresponding figures for 
medium-sized and large companies displayed less statistically significant differences between 
the innovation performance groups of the host and home countries of FBMs[2]. Thus, here 
again, firm size is relevant to the connection between FBMs and firm-level innovativeness. 
 
Table 3. Reported p-values for Mann Whitney U tests between differences in the innovation 
performance groups 
 Higher +2 Higher Same Lower 
 All included/0% and 100% excluded 
Higher 0.157        /0.014*     
Same 0.049*      /<0.001*** 0.307        /0.003**    
Lower <0.001***/<0.001*** <0.001***/<0.001*** 0.002**    /0.037*   
Lower -2 0.035*      /<0.001*** 0.222        /0.040* 0.785        /0.642 0.020*      /0.029* 
Notes: Significant at the level of *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001. Number of comparisons: Higher +2=75/56; 
Higher=144/101; Same=160/101; Lower=120/93; Lower -2=65/43 
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Figure 3. The shares of innovative firms with FBMs (within the EU-28) from (A) more and less 
innovative countries and (B) higher or lower innovation performance groups according to the pair-
wise country comparisons (0% and 100% excluded) 
 
These results do not support our hypothesis (H3), based on the existing literature, which 
suggested that large differences between the levels of innovativeness of host and home 
countries would negatively affect the impact of FBMs on the innovativeness of firms in a 
similar fashion at both ends of the spectrum. Thus, we expected the relationship to be concave 
with the “Similar” group having the highest shares of innovative firms. However, as can be 
observed from the group “Lower -2” (Figure 3b), there seems to be a threshold in the gap 
between the low innovativeness of the home and high innovativeness of the host countries of 
FBMs, after which the association with innovative firms is weaker. In other words, the 
relationship becomes concave once the difference between the home and host countries of BMs 
is sufficiently large. 
 
In addition, if we consider our overarching research concern in terms of the decision as to 
whether or not a company should have FBM, the results can be expressed in the form of a 
classification (or a decision) tree (cf. Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009; Sohn and Kim, 2012). As 
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shown in Figure 4, the results of the classification tree support the findings of the earlier 
analysis: firms with FBMs are more innovative than firms that do not have FBMs, and firms 
with FBMs from less innovative countries (particularly if the difference is not too large as 
discussed above) are more likely to be innovative than firms with FBMs from more innovative 
countries as shown by the higher mean values. The modest R2 value (0.19), however, indicates 
that, naturally, board diversity is only one out of the several factors (including e.g. R&D inputs) 
influencing the innovativeness of firms. 
 
Figure 4. Classification tree depicting the share of innovative firms, as means, based on the “choice” 
of having or not having FBMs according to the pair-wise country comparisons (0% and 100% 
excluded) 
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DISCUSSION 
The hypothesis (H1) that there is a definite positive association between FBMs and innovative 
firms was confirmed. Moreover, firm level innovativeness seems to be more strongly related 
to the presence of FBMs in the case of small rather than medium-sized or large companies. 
This seems reasonable as medium-sized and large companies have more in-house capacities 
for innovation. In this logic, the additional knowledge of FBMs supposedly has a stronger 
impact in small companies, where in-house capabilities are more restricted than in medium-
sized or large firms. However, the testing of the latter two hypotheses (H2 and H3) provided 
the unexpected finding that firms with FBMs from less innovative countries are more 
innovative than those with FBMs from more innovative countries; this contradicts the 
expectations, based on the literature review. Four potential (interlinked) explanations can be 
suggested to explain this finding. 
 
Firstly, FBMs from less innovative countries might be positively associated with the 
innovativeness of firms in more innovative countries, because firms in more innovative 
countries might have a higher absorptive capacity. In contrast, firms from less innovative 
countries might lack sufficient absorptive capacity to make use of the knowledge possessed by 
BMs from more innovative countries[3]. That is, the “high tech economies” gain from “low tech 
country” BMs, due to their (potentially) higher absorptive capacities, but the inverse applies 
less frequently. As Nooteboom et al. (2007: p.1028) argue, “the more one already knows, the 
further afield one has to go, in more exotic directions, to still find something new”. For 
companies in innovative countries this provides, on the one hand, an incentive to look for 
highly different types of knowledge, and on the other hand the capacity to make use of it. 
Contrarily, no matter how valuable the knowledge of their FBMs might be for acquiring new 
information and fostering innovation, without sufficient absorptive capacity firms in less 
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technologically advanced countries may find it difficult to exploit the knowledge gained from 
FBMs from more innovative countries. 
 
Secondly, the value of knowledge originating from less innovative countries may not be 
recognized. The issue relates to the value attached to the prestige of BMs from different 
settings. For example, Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) and Kumar (2013) have argued that – 
due to a sense of superiority or a form of ethnocentrism – the perceived value of knowledge 
may be regarded as being much lower than it actually is if it originates from a less innovative 
country. Thus, there may be greater social recognition by other BMs of the value of the 
knowledge of BMs from highly innovative countries, and the latter are more likely to be 
considered as sources of innovation. Hence, it is possible that only the most exceptional 
individuals (the crème-de-la-crème) from less innovative countries are recruited as FBMs. 
They would then be expected to make an above average contribution to the innovation 
performance of these firms compared to BMs from more innovative countries. 
 
Thirdly, and complementary to the second argument, FBMs from more innovative countries 
can be selected for motives other than for the competences they bring into the company (van 
der Walt and Ingley, 2003). For instance, FBMs from more innovative countries might be 
appointed to raise the visibility and prestige of the firm so as to make it more attractive for 
investors (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2005). Another possibility is that FBMs from more 
innovative countries might be appointed for reasons of ownership and control rather than 
innovation – including expansion, particularly through foreign direct investments, acquisition 
and mergers (Mizruchi, 1996; Choi et al., 2012). 
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Lastly, the size of the boards is likely to be a factor facilitating the reported effects of FBMs 
vis-à-vis the innovativeness of the firm. It is logical to think that the larger the board the more 
likely it is to have FBMs from less innovative countries. Similarly, as shown by earlier 
empirical accounts (De Cleyn and Braet, 2012), the multitude of perspectives inherent in larger 
boards seem to enhance firms’ innovativeness. Thus, larger boards are more likely than smaller 
ones to possess innovative ideas and are also more likely to include FBMs from less innovative 
countries. However, it has to be noted that due to increased coordination and communication 
costs, it might be more difficult for FBMs to get their voices heard in larger boards (Brunninge 
et al., 2012).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Contributions and implications 
This paper has set out to explore the novel topic of FBMs and their association with the 
innovativeness of the firm, utilizing data collected from the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk, 
2016). In relation to our hypotheses and the existing literature, the following findings are 
especially notable. Firstly, firms with FBMs are more innovative than firms that do not have 
FBMs. This finding is in line with earlier studies (e.g. Cook and Glass, 2015) addressing the 
link between innovativeness and other types of board diversity (e.g. ethnicity and gender). An 
apparently more surprising finding was that our results did not corroborate the suggestion made 
in earlier studies that firms with FBMs from more innovative countries are more innovative. 
Instead, this paper found evidence for an inverse association: generally, firms with FBMs from 
less innovative countries are more likely to be innovative than firms with FBMs from more 
innovative countries.  
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There are a number of potential interlinked explanations for this unexpected finding. Firms in 
more innovative countries are well equipped to utilize new ideas, whereas firms in less-
developed countries might lack the capacity to do the same (i.e. absorptive capacity or the lack 
thereof). Further, FBMs from less innovative countries are more critically evaluated and thus, 
on average, have to have stronger competences compared to FBMs from more innovative 
countries in order to be recruited as directors. Relatedly, FBMs from more innovative countries 
might be selected for reasons of prestige or ownership and control, and to a lesser extent for 
their competences with regard to innovation. Finally, board size can affect the results presented 
here, since larger boards are more likely to include FBMs from less innovative countries, and 
since it is likely that board size itself affects the innovativeness of the firm. In terms of a more 
general theoretical interpretation, our results support particularly perspectives of resource 
dependency theory and group effectiveness/diversity theories.  
 
Given the exploratory nature of this paper, caution is required when formulating practical 
recommendations. Generally speaking, the existing literature is quite sparse in terms of 
expressing advice relating to the presence of FBMs in corporate boards. Most commonly, 
companies are advised to include FBMs in order to source additional knowledge (Ujunwa et 
al., 2012) or to increase the international credibility of the company (Oxelheim and Randøy, 
2005). However, FBMs have not been recommended so far in relation to their innovative 
capabilities. Our results suggest that companies should pay more attention to the contribution 
of FBMs to the firm’s innovativeness, and especially to the value of recruiting FBMs from less 
innovative countries. As outlined previously, it is often presumed that the flow of knowledge 
is directed from more innovative to less innovative countries (Michailova and Jormanainen, 
2011). From this perspective, the positive association between the presence of FBMs from less 
innovative countries and the innovativeness of a company is somehow counterintuitive. This 
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indicates the need to address this widespread intuition and, instead, to understand that FBMs 
from less innovative countries are potentially beneficial for a firm’s innovative capability. 
Thus, instead of focusing on the practical implications, the results from this study encourage 
further research in this promising field: the origin of BMs is only one of many aspects that have 
to be taken into account when appointing new BMs, but our results do suggest that this merits 
closer examination, both in academic research and in strategic management practice. However, 
more inferential analysis, an agenda that is discussed in greater detail below, is needed to 
formulate more precise policy recommendations. 
 
Limitations and an agenda for future research 
It has to be noted that, due to its exploratory approach, the paper has a number of limitations, 
which suggest several directions for more detailed analyses which, thus, form a research agenda 
for future studies on the topic. Firstly, this agenda includes testing the impact of FBMs in 
different business sectors, as knowledge requirements are likely to be sectorally varied, as is 
the importance of innovation. Secondly, the role of cultural (e.g. in terms of language) and 
institutional (e.g. in terms of legislation) similarity, as well as board size, as moderating or 
facilitating factors of cross-border knowledge transfer driven by FBMs need to be evaluated 
with regression models (consistent with earlier literature). Adding variables such as the 
turnover, profitability and business segments of the firms, as well as the age, expertise and 
experience of the FBMs into the analysis will alleviate the risk of endogeneity present in 
descriptive approaches such as that utilized in this paper. This will require extensive procedures 
to collect the data for every firm in the sample, and, therefore, will most probably necessitate 
scholars to concentrate on smaller regional scales, such as individual countries, rather than the 
EU scale applied here.  
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Thirdly, the analysis only covers certain aspects of innovation: technological product 
(measured by patents) and service (measured by trademarks) innovation. Thus, while patents 
and trademarks are valid proxy indicators for certain types of innovation (e.g. Acs et al., 2002; 
Mendonca et al., 2004), other types of innovation, such as organizational and marketing 
innovation, are not covered by these two measures. This is a limitation since, for example, the 
internationalization of markets and, thus, marketing innovations are likely to be factors that 
inform decisions to appoint FBMs, while it is reasonable to assume that FBMs should also have 
an impact on the level of organizational innovation within a firm. This shortcoming calls for 
applying the procedures and definitions presented for example in the Oslo Manual for 
collecting innovation data (OECD, 2005), accompanied by a specific set of questionnaire items 
to unravel the impacts of FBMs on innovation other than strict product (goods and services) 
innovation. That is, with survey data one would have a strong potential to analyse more closely 
the interaction between FBMs and different types of innovation. Moreover, our decision to use 
a (simple, non-discriminating) dichotomous variables (0 if no trademark or patent/if no FBMs 
and 1 if a patent and/or a trademark/FBMs), with no recognition of the number and quality of 
patents, trademarks and FBMs (i.e. no scale) is a limitation that constrains us from conducting 
more elaborate analyses, besides the chosen approach. Further analysis should also take into 
account this “scale” issue by exploring: 1) whether firms with FBMs are only marginally or 
significantly more innovative (have multiple patents and trademarks) than firms with solely 
domestic board rooms and 2) whether there are minimum or maximum thresholds, as suggested 
by the token theory (see Torchia et al., 2011), to the number of FBMs for them to have a 
significant influence on innovation. 
 
Fourthly, the causal relationship between absorptive capacity, FBMs and firm innovativeness 
need to be more intensively explored. Our results give a first indication that the absorptive 
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capacity of firms might limit knowledge transfer from FBMs. Future research could address 
this topic more specifically with more detailed datasets or primary data collected, for example, 
through surveys and more sophisticated methods (than the ones applied here) to quantify 
technological differences and the absorptive capacities of firms and BMs, and to establish 
causalities. 
 
Fifthly, an obvious conclusion is that there is a need to acknowledge that FBMs can be selected 
for reasons other than to boost innovativeness. This generates a number of interesting 
questions, which include, for example, the following: To what extent are FBMs selected to 
boost the innovativeness of firms as opposed to being selected for other reasons, so that 
heightened innovativeness represents a form of additional or ‘collateral’ advantage? And are 
only the highly innovative crème-de-la-crème selected as FBMs from technologically less 
developed countries and, if so, how are they identified and recruited? These types of research 
questions will require an integrative and qualitative approach including interview data and firm 
annual reports. 
 
Finally, we have purposefully avoided making a definite statement on the causal relationship 
between FBMs and firm innovativeness, since theoretically it is possible to argue for the 
existence of causality in both directions. It can be argued that FBMs increase a firm’s 
innovativeness, and alternatively that innovative firms appoint more FBMs. Sophisticated 
time-series firm-matched data on the years that FBMs have joined the boards, as well as data 
on the years when patents and trademarks have been granted, are needed to tackle this 
shortcoming. However, and again, this will potentially reduce the sample sizes of studies on 
causality due to the amount of work needed to collect this kind of data. Since this paper 
provides more of an overview of the novel topic at hand utilizing reliable data (as shown e.g. 
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by Pinto Ribeiro et al., 2010) from the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk, 2016) for 28 EU-
countries and roughly 1.5 million companies, the data collection efforts required to analyse 
causality are beyond its scope. Rather than providing a definitive answer to this question, the 
paper sought to assess whether an association between innovativeness and FBMs reveals a 
fruitful research area for further investigation to 1) suggest that the topic merits closer 
examination both in academic research and in corporate governance practice and 2) to 
contribute to the shaping of what remains a rather novel topic. The results and the proposed 
research agenda support this aim in general.  
 
NOTES 
[1] This is further elaborated by a thorough search procedure on board diversity and innovation utilizing 
the Scopus database by Elsevier: there were a handful of articles that presented empirical findings on 
the relationship between board diversity (in terms of ethnicity, gender, etc.) and the innovativeness of 
the firm, but none of them addressed the issue of FBMs underlining the empirical novelty of the topic.  
[2] Results table can be obtained from the corresponding author upon request. 
[3] These speculations are analogous to the discussion on absorptive capacity and technology transfer in 
EU’s lagging regions and countries (cf. Oughton et al., 2002). 
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